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Paper Abstract
Evidence of the decline of the traditional Westphalian nation-state, resulting from the rise of loosely monitored borders and non-governmental actors, has caused concern among Western strategic policy makers who view the preservation of national sovereignty as paramount to the preservation of global stability. 1 Current policy in both the defense and diplomatic realms indicate that the U.S. will have a vested interest in directly supporting regional stability efforts for the foreseeable future. A critical gap in civilian regional security assistance planning and coordination currently exists between Washington D.C. and the country team. The organizational structure, which supports theater security cooperation and security capacity building, is misaligned. The civilian led inter-agency has a critical gap at the regional level that acts to cripple their operational planning to accomplish their 
INTRODUCTION
The Maghreb and Sahel regions of Northern Africa exemplify the growing instability in under-governed regions due to disruptive and potentially powerful non-state actors such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), local criminal syndicates, and increasingly transnational criminal organizations. Such groups threaten the very existence of effective regional governance due to reduction in international tourism and business, which eliminates desperately needed income to maintain security and infrastructure. 3 Evidence of the decline of the traditional Westphalian nation-state, resulting from the rise of loosely monitored borders and non-governmental actors, has caused an unavoidable paradigm shift among
Western strategic policy makers who view the strengthening of national sovereignty as paramount to the preservation of global stability. The complexity of the web of funding and associated legal complexities is systematic and unlikely to completely change due to the need for such changes to be legislated. The inherent intricacies involved often result in a parochial environment that is interagency in name only. The primary effects of such a system are felt most keenly at the local or operational level. Thus, the most workable solutions must come at the local and regional level.
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The organizational structure, which currently manages the origination and application of theater security assistance programs, can be divided into three levels. The Executive Interagency collaboration at the country team has proven to be an effective tool to increase the country level effectiveness of U.S. government security assistance efforts but lacks a regional perspective. Civilian strategic level efforts are effective but compartmentalized at the Washington D.C. level and no regional, operational planning level exists. Security cooperation efforts supporting theater strategy using GCC's provide an excellent working example of the potential to attain more effective civilian security support from a regional platform. The military is adept at working on a theater level; nesting tactical, operational and strategic goals to achieve the desired end state. The operational planning process utilized at the GCC level uses a true planning process to involve all theater/command aspects to achieve theater strategic goals.
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The need to utilize scarce foreign security assistance funds in prudent and efficient ways is critical. 
MAIN ARGUMENT
A critical gap in civilian regional security assistance planning and coordination currently exists between Washington D.C. and the country team. The organizational structure that supports theater security cooperation and security capacity building is misaligned. The civilian led interagency has a critical gap at the regional level that acts to cripple their operational planning to accomplish their Title 22 mission. In order to undertake their Title 10 responsibilities, the DOD views the world from a theater-centric perspective with the regional GCC acting as the critical operational piece uniting the D.C. strategic with the tactical/execution teams at the Embassy/country level. 
31
Standard rotations are a constant strain on program continuity. Without a permanent civilian security coordination presence at the GCC, who is required to maintain continuity and oversight of interagency coordination as a way to proven effectiveness, valuable lessons can be lost. This was the case in Ukraine when a successful security cooperation-working group at EUCOM established an extremely effective operational planning and strategic execution relationship with Embassy Ukraine. When normal personnel rotation took place, however, the valuable lessons were lost as they were based on relationships and not a formalized and monitored coordination structure. 32 An established civilian Theater Security
Coordinator could prevent such institutional memory loss through mandated record keeping of the interagency process regarding security cooperation.
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Threats to regional governance and stability come about for a multitude of reasons and derive from both stable and unstable countries alike. Familiarity with host government personnel and institutions that derive from effective cooperation helps in all cases. DOD and civilian interagency capabilities must be weighed with regional realities and the need to regionally coordinate with various country team programs. In other words, no potential tools in providing security assistance can be discounted. All tools such as a civilian Regional Security Coordinator should be attempted in the effort to optimize civilian-military cooperation.
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Coordination between the civilian and military tools of government is not new. The
Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) initiative in Vietnam proved to be successful due to its integration of accountability, multiple level planning cooperation, and joint decision-making. Unfortunately, those lessons were victims of an unpopular war and lost until recently. 35 The benefits of permanently re-learning these difficult lessons are critical as U.S. government security cooperation programs enter new fiscal territory as budgets draw down following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the end, the purpose of theater security cooperation is to prevent small problems from turning into large and costly ones. A civilian Security Cooperation Coordinator would aid in this process 32 Ibid., [11] [12] by providing much need regional perspective concerning security assistance progress and shortcomings. Barring the creation of regionally located diplomatic coordination centers; the GCC provides the best venue for such a position.
36

THE CIVILIAN THEATER SECURITY COORDINATOR POSITION
Using the example of AFRICOM, the Civilian Theater Security Coordinator (TSC) position would reside in the Special Staff area of the GCC command structure. There, the TSC would be in the position to be independent from, but work closely with, the civilian Foreign Policy Advisor. The TSC would work closely with each of the directorates as needed but particularly with the J-5, J-7, and J-9. 37 Also, in addition to the country teams within the region, the TSC would correspond directly with Department of State functional and regional bureaus as needed. Finally, the TSC could act in an organizing and planning role in communicating the regional strategy to various agencies outside of DOS and DOD who maintain a presence in the region. This would be done to assist the country teams in building unity and preventing agency colloquialism from causing problems.
38
The TSC staff structure would be lead by the coordinator, who would preferably be of Minister Counselor (MC) or Counselor (OC) rank (equivalent to the military rank of 0-7 and 0-8, respectively country team structure of the region. The staff would be structured to be able to work seamlessly across tribal and interagency boundaries. 39 The role of the civilian TSC staff will vary based on regional needs. In developed regions, the TSC will focus on cooperation, relationship building, and support. The TSC will play a secondary role as regional emergency action planning intermediary to the GCC, and regional information resource for country teams. The TSC can additionally retain all security cooperation and regional emergency action records and procedures while acting as an advisor and resource for regional issues. In underdeveloped areas prone to instability, the TSC could execute a more robust training synchronization role in addition to providing the same services to the country team that would be offered in more stable regions. 40 The TSC staff would focus on a nations' actual ability to respond to an incident and less on equipment and military sales, which is already adequately coordinated through the established DSCA-POL/MIL relationship. The TSC will primarily monitor the effectiveness of Theater Security
Cooperation programs designed to increase a country's security capacity.
41
HURDLES TO IMPLEMENTATION
Adding one relatively small staff to an already robust GCC headquarters appears on the surface to be a small initiative. There are, however, many procedural, legal, fiscal, and cultural barriers that would need to be bested to allow for the successful implementation of the civilian TSC.
Though a regional presence like a TSC would greatly assist in navigating the existing patchwork of legislative authorities that enormously complicate theater security cooperation at the country team level, reform would greatly help. The primary problem is the ambassador's inability to shift security assistance funds to address pressing needs. A permanent method of pooling funds among the interagency would help. Increasing funding flexibility to empower the ambassador to utilize funding as they (and their country team advisors) see fit, would be an obvious answer. The ambassador should have be the final authorization on how to apply U.S. resources to the greatest affect. 42 As discussed previously, the GSCF shows great potential as a model mechanism that provides some level of flexibility. It focuses on the security assistance need and not the agency that performs the function. For instance, it offers support for the services that execute specific functions such as maritime security, narcotics deterrence, border control, and counter terrorism but does not specify the type of service that can be used. This gives great flexibility to DOD and DOS planners at the strategic level. A similar tool should be granted to the ambassador and country team to address urgent and non-crisis situations. 43 Though the GSFC could potentially provide a template for future legislative attempts to provide legal and fiscal flexibility to diplomatic and military actors, it does not address the prohibition on police training that is presented by Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
Section 660 should be amended to allow country teams to promptly address growing crisis in failing states. The current waiver process presents an unnecessary barrier to providing security assistance to failing states and accomplishing the goals outlined in the National Security Strategy. 44 From an organizational cultural perspective, certain tribes within the State Department could reject the idea of a TSC. They could argue that the country team is an effective method for coordination and training synchronization and they can rely on the respective agency headquarters to relay important information to the pertinent Geographic Combatant Command. Though DSCA does coordinate effectively with POL/MIL at a strategic level in Washington D.C., no civilian theater security coordination takes place at the regional level at all. In a time before the GCC, a lack of regional coordination may have been acceptable, but the current global security environment requires greater coordination to meet the goals of the National Security Strategy.
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Finally, the criticality of the lack of geographic regional realignment must be addressed. Currently, the State Department and the Department of Defense maintain differing global geographic alignments, which affect their force structure, geo-strategic doctrine, and fiscal distributions. This must be corrected by interagency collaboration in order for the TSC or any truly interagency collaboration to occur. Due to the growth of GCC's, this issue is quite serious and will likely require political intervention for resolution.
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CONCLUSIONS
In a time of fiscal restraint, more efficient methods must be created in order to achieve the expected results. Though a greater regional, in theater, State Department presence such as a Regional Diplomatic Center is eventually required; a Civilian Theater Security Coordinator at the GCC would be a relatively quick and legislation-free method to increase communication and training effectiveness in a short time. The use of the GCC platform for DOS regional programs is the most cost effective way to move forward and bring greater alignment to U.S. foreign policy implementation.
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A whole-of-government approach with alignment at all three levels (national [D.C.], regional, and local) of organization is critical. Though legal, financial, doctrinal, and cultural issues need to be overcome to make security capacity building more efficient and productive, the end goal of greater global stability is worth it. All policy instruments from Congress to the Executive branch have stated the same need. The issue is how to get there. A civilian Theater Security Coordinator would help to finesse the regional changes needed and manage the results. A civilian TSC would provide direct synchronization support for legal, financial, global regional alignment, and program issues between the country team, GCC, and Washington D.C.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
A civilian regional view of policy and security assistance is missing, consequently allowing and often forcing, DOD to respond in its absence. This gap is destabilizing and confusing to both the trainers and trainees. To some in the global community, the military appears to dominate the foreign policy execution of the United States. We tend to send the wrong, though well-intentioned, message that despite our stated beliefs in a civilian-led government we really expect the DOD to lead foreign policy issues. If this is the case, problems such as Mali, where the U.S. trained future coup backers, may be the tip of the iceberg. It appears that foreign policy execution may need to be realigned. 48 Ibid., 7-9.
